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McDonald’s has become synonymous with low-wage, low-status, high-
stress employment: the “McJob.” But that did not deter Tessa Lowinger and
Jennifer Wiebe from trying to make McJobs something better. Their 1998 battle
to unionize McDonald’s in Squamish, BC, was an important confrontation
between Canadian workers and multinationals during the 1990s that attracted
international media attention. The two young women, backed by a union experi-
enced in representing service workers, successfully organized their McDonald’s.
Their campaign raised hopes of  a long-sought union breakthrough in the service
sector. However, just over a year later, McDonald’s had triumphed and the union
had decertified. Ultimately, the Squamish experience teaches us about the limits
of  traditional unionism for fast food workers in the current legislative framework
and economic climate, and the need for workers, labour activists, and scholars of
labour to continue to explore new options. 
This paper combines previously unstudied internal union documents
and interviews with union leaders with a consideration of  how the Squamish
campaign compares with other campaigns for worker representation at
McDonald’s globally. While I draw on the excellent literature about workers’
struggles at McDonald’s, my analysis of  Squamish as a test case in global context
leads me to depart significantly from the existing literature in one important
respect. Where most scholars focus on the chances for traditional unionization
to succeed in the fast food industry, this paper argues that the defeat at
Squamish and McDonald’s success thwarting workplace representation in a vari-
ety of  national contexts demonstrates that traditional models of  organization
and collective bargaining are simply not feasible in this industry under current
conditions. It then engages with the developing literature on both social move-
ment unionism and new models and forms of  employee representation, using
the Squamish experience as a case study to evaluate current debates and probe
what approaches may best aid fast food workers in increasing their power at the
point of  production.1
Organizing fast food workers has long been a concern of  North
American unions. In Canada, the government brokered a mid-century labour-
capital-state détente, starting in 1944 with PC 1003. In the postwar era, the
largest unions abandoned all pretenses to job control and expelled radical mem-
bers and unions from the mainstream of  the labour movement. In return, capital
agreed to recognize the legitimacy of  unionized labour to negotiate wages and
benefits; and governments passed legislation that provided for some measure of
union stability. The unionized employment landscape of  the largely prosperous
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twenty-five years to 1970 was marked by rising wages, benefits, and job security,
primarily for a white male worker in the manufacturing, resource extraction, and
transportation sectors. However, this postwar accord was only temporary. When
the rate of  profit began falling globally in the late 1960s, coupled with rising
commodity prices in the early 1970s, capital and the state began to systematically
dismantle the welfare state, attack unions, and ferociously resist new organiza-
tion. As capital moved most of  its manufacturing facilities to non-union regions
of  the world, more employment shifted to the service and retail sector, workers
who had largely remained outside of  the efforts of  trade unions until the 1970s.2
Labour unions that had neglected organizing new workers and become increas-
ingly bureaucratic found themselves on the defensive. Assessing the BC situa-
tion, Ben Isitt concludes that BC workers had less capacity, at least through
mainstream unions, to challenge the prerogatives of  an increasingly global capi-
talist class, just when that capacity was needed to resist the rising tide of  neolib-
eralism.3
In the 1990s, the major unions began to take notice of  an aging mem-
bership and the growth of  this primarily non-union work as a major employ-
ment sector. Some of  them prioritized fast food organizing. There was much
work to be done. In 1998, the year of  the Squamish campaign, only eight per
cent of  workers in accommodation and food services belonged to a union.4 The
Teamsters and the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) launched
certification drives at McDonald’s franchises in St. Hubert and Orangeville
respectively. In the Teamsters campaign, ownership resorted to shutting down
the restaurant rather than recognizing the union, an indication of  how commit-
ted McDonald’s was to staying union-free in North America.  Unlike these
unions, Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) Local 3000 had experience and success
organizing the fast food sector. However, the fight at the Squamish McDonald’s
proved to be its highest profile and most challenging restaurant campaign yet.5 It
is of  particular interest as an example of  the franchise system acting as a power-
ful barrier to unionization and a demonstration of  the inequities of  labour law in
British Columbia. It prompts us to consider why the aggressive tactics of  an
experienced service work union still failed to keep the workplace certified.
Considered in the global context, it is an instructive illustration of  McDonald’s
ability to evade meaningful workplace representation, no matter what the regula-
tory context. Finally, it is a case study that can help us evaluate the possibilities
and drawbacks of  new and emerging forms of  workplace organization.
The campaign at Squamish differed significantly from others undertak-
en in the same period, and these differences make it the key campaign to study.
Unlike the other unions who attempted to organize fast food workers in the
1990s, including HERE, the Teamsters, and the SEIU, CAW 3000 had a deep
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background and expertise in fast food unionism. After its uneven early years, the
union had become a responsive, democratic local with a keen understanding of
the needs of  fast food workers backed by the deep pockets of  the CAW. It could
boast a record of  fighting, and winning, battles with corporate management. In
his 2001 study of  Local 3000 and young workers, sociologist Stuart Tannock
noted the reputation the local had won across Canada as one of  the most dedi-
cated and effective unions representing youth and service workers.6 The drive
benefitted from the leadership of  workers who, while young, were union-wise
because of  their upbringing in Squamish, a town with many union members.
Squamish’s union density also meant the union and workers had solid communi-
ty support, a significant benefit when attempting to organize a business depend-
ent on public patronage.7 The Squamish campaign presented a nearly ideal
opportunity to organize a McDonald’s. If  an experienced, democratic local with
the resources to win could not beat the only McDonald’s in a union town, what
hope was there for success elsewhere?
Opened in 1987 by Paul Savage, the Squamish McDonald’s sits beside
the Sea-to-Sky highway, a busy road connecting the populous Lower Mainland of
British Columbia to the leisure mecca of  the Whistler-Blackcomb region. Many
Squamish residents were unionized workers in the railroad and pulp and paper
industries.8 The restaurant was often busy, and Grade 12 students Tessa
Lowinger and Jennifer Wiebe soon tired of  being screamed at by managers for
trivial mistakes, often in front of  dozens of  customers. "I was taken out into the
lobby and yelled at in front of  customers and made to cry," recalled Lowinger.9
Eighteen year-old Billie Harrison also reported being dressed down in front of
customers and sent crying to tell the customers the mistake she had made.
Reflecting on her treatment, she recalled, “They made me feel really small.”10
This treatment of  workers ran counter to standard McDonald’s man-
agement strategy. To avoid unionization and to motivate employees without rais-
ing wages, the fast food chain has stressed positive reinforcement for workers
and instilling a team concept to keep workers motivated and quiescent. In Fast
Food Nation, Eric Schlosser describes a fast food industry conference where
industry leaders discussed motivating employees without spending money,
through employee awards, “teamwork, empowering workers, and making it
‘fun.’” Sociologist Robin Leidner, who did participant research at a McDonald’s
for her book Fast Food, Fast Talk, reflected that “the apparently respectful, even-
handed psychological management style that McDonald’s encourages helped
make the repetitive, fast-paced, low autonomy, low-paid jobs tolerable to work-
ers.”11 Conversely, workers were angered when managers treated workers with
disrespect. 
Ester Reiter conducted participant research at Burger King for her
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landmark study Making Fast Food. She echoes Leidner’s observations, indicating
that the strategy is widespread across the industry. In the discourse of  Burger
King’s management manuals, “Worker satisfaction is an individual phenomenon
defined not through decent pay scales and working conditions, but in the less
tangible area of  psychological concepts.”12 Nor did this strategy originate with
the fast food industry; Reiter points out that restaurant owners were using the
theories of  Elton Mayo as far back as the 1950s, in order to reduce turnover
without raising wages.13
There were also safety concerns at the Squamish McDonald’s. Sick
employees were routinely pressured to stay on the job. If  workers were absent
because of  illness, they were told to find a replacement before their absence
would be condoned. Both Wiebe and Lowinger reported being forced to stay on
site in the employees’ bathroom for two hours after arriving at work sick with
cramps and nausea, waiting for a replacement to arrive. Lowinger described
unsafe work conditions.  "One light switch had no panel," Lowinger said.
"You'd actually get a shock when you touched it."14
How bad was working at the Squamish McDonald’s? The question of
what motivates workers to organize in the fast food industry is important for
both scholars and labour activists. While most observers would view the
McDonald’s labour process as inherently difficult and alienating, it often appears
to be specific, on-the-ground conflicts with individual managers and owners that
prompt unionization drives, as is the case in many other workplaces. Indeed,
Schlosser asserts, “the personality of  a fast food restaurant’s manager largely
determined whether working there would be an enjoyable experience or an
unpleasant one.”15 Reiter, Leidner and Schlosser have observed that paternalistic
management is the standard in the industry; however, the hectic pace of  work
and stress of  serving the public often exposes cracks in the façade of  work as
fun. These stresses caused the campaign in Squamish and were also significant
factors in Orangeville, where Sarah Inglis complained about management being
rude, sexist, and “making people feel disgusting about themselves.”16 At the
McDonald’s in St. Hubert, it was reported that pro-union workers were tired of
“the stresses of  the job, of  being yelled at until they cried.”17
Beyond abusive management, wages, working conditions, and the
labour process were also a major concern at both locations. In Orangeville,
workers objected to the casualization of  labour, especially when a new manager
reduced the scheduled hours of  several long-term employees. At St. Hubert,
being timed with a stopwatch and not receiving raises after six years were key
grievances. In the final analysis, it is difficult to separate the degrading treatment
experienced by workers from McDonald’s fundamental labour process, manage-
ment strategies notwithstanding. In an industry that views its employees as costs
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to be relentlessly squeezed for maximum productivity at minimal wages, benefits,
and security, the inherent exploitation of  the job is always going to be visible to
many workers. Reiter's conclusion, that "it is not traditional union sentiments
that have spurred the moves to unionize, but unacceptable and arbitrary manage-
ment practices," is an unhelpful simplification. First, grievances with arbitrary
and unfair management have long been a prime motivator for union struggles in
a variety of  industries; the ability to defend oneself  from capricious treatment
and favouritism certainly seems a traditional union sentiment. Second, com-
plaints over wages and working conditions were certainly motivating factors in
the three Canadian campaigns to organize McDonald’s restaurants. 
Again, it is difficult and probably fruitless to try to separate dehumaniz-
ing and arbitrary treatment from the fast food model, no matter what the manu-
als state. Jennifer Talwar makes a poignant point when she observes that:
The fast food industry stresses temporary status, the contingency of
industry need, and an income that gains societal contempt rather than
respect. No wonder workers behind the counter suffer harassment
from customers, feel they are not respected, and rarely wear their uni-
forms in public. The premium placed on customer service, the shaping
of  personality, and the dichotomizing of  feelings between work and
home further widens the gap between private life and work life and
poses a contradiction for the fast food organization. The more the gap
widens, the more managers are required to gain control over the private
lives and emotions of  their workers.18
Fast food work poses the same contradictions for labour unions and activists as
it does for managers. The examples show there is clearly a demand for pride,
dignity, and respect as well as better wages and conditions. The question is: what
sort of  organizing can harness those demands and effectively increase the power
of  these workers in such low-status, dehumanizing, and precarious jobs?
Unlike Lowinger and Wiebe, most of  the sector’s workers respond to
unhappiness by voting with their feet. The commonality of  turnover is one clue
to how widespread dissatisfaction among workers is, and how little workers
expect from these employers. Most often, poor treatment at work or dissatisfac-
tion with pay, benefits, or processes is dealt with by exchanging a poor job at
McDonald’s with a new one at Home Depot, Tim Horton’s, or the Gap.
Lowinger and Wiebe could have quit. Instead, they decided to organize. In July
1998, the two women voiced their concerns to Lowinger’s father, Hans, a BC
Rail worker and CAW member. Hans called his steward, who contacted Roger
Crowther, an organizer at CAW 3000. At this time card check, a system that
automatically certified a union when enough workers signed union cards, was a
legal means of  organizing in BC. Wiebe and Lowinger canvassed their coworkers
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at their homes, and quickly enlisted more than 55 per cent of  78 workers,
exceeding the minimum necessary for automatic union certification. Franchise
owner Paul Savage challenged the vote at the Labour Relations Board, claiming
that not all workers were given a chance to cast ballots. In fact, the 28 workers
he claimed had been disenfranchised were new employees hired specifically to
dilute union support and halt the drive. In one early pay period during the dis-
pute, the number of  employees skyrocketed from 74 to 104, part of  Savage’s
plan to dilute the mass of  pro-union workers.19
It should be noted that the certification would likely never have hap-
pened without the BC labour law provision for certification by card check.
Under card check certification, once a mandated percentage of  workers have
signed a union card, certification procedures can begin. By contrast, the United
States and some other Canadian jurisdictions first require card signing and then
an election for certification. This is a lengthy process that allows employers time
to intimidate workers and hire new ones to dilute union support. In his book
Differences That Matter: Social Policy and The Working Poor in The United States and
Canada, sociologist Dan Zuberi identifies card check as the major reason for the
higher union density among British Columbia workers compared to workers in
the US. Abolishing card check was one of  the first acts of  the right-wing BC
Liberal government after their election in 2001.20
Another challenge to the certification vote came from within. In
August, Vancouver labour lawyer Randy Kaardal, representing a group of   “a
dozen or so” anti-union employees, submitted a brief  to the Labour Relations
Board contending that Squamish employees could not accept a contract for
union representation because they were below the age of  majority. The Board
disagreed, recognizing that these workers were old enough to accept employ-
ment, and thus were old enough to join a union. It also pointed out that
Kaardal’s argument contradicted labour law precedent. The nature of  Kaardal’s
involvement raised several questions. How could a group of  teenagers making
between seven and nine dollars an hour afford the services of  a lawyer who cus-
tomarily billed $250 for an hour of  his labour? If  they were old enough to retain
a lawyer, how were they then too young to sign contracts? Kardaal denied that
he actually represented McDonald’s or Savage, and maintained that he had
slashed his fees for this case because of  “principle reasons."21
After the board’s decision, Savage temporarily retreated, and agreed to
recognize the certification. Unlike the Cappellis of  Montreal, who closed down
their St-Hubert McDonald’s franchise in response to a union drive, Savage stated
he would not close the Squamish location. With that, the Squamish McDonald’s
became the only unionized Golden Arches in North America.22 While they cer-
tainly had much work to do before a first contract, this victory alone was a sig-
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nificant step beyond what workers had achieved in other countries. The workers
who had some form of  representation at McDonald’s did so in countries where
some form of  sectoral bargaining or access to works councils had been legislated
upon McDonald’s, usually with little actual impact on wages, benefits, and work
conditions.23 Like other traditional campaigns in the United States, McDonald’s
had defeated the earlier Canadian campaigns in St. Hubert and Orangeville. In
St. Hubert, the company and franchisees resorted to closing the outlet; in
Orangeville McDonald’s challenged the certification, improved working condi-
tions, doled out fringe benefits like free food, and reportedly intimidated work-
ers.24 Savage and the company would employ similar strategies to combat Wiebe,
Lowinger, and CAW 3000 in Squamish.
The media soon flocked to tell the story of  the unlikely victory. Most
accounts focused on the youth of  Wiebe and Lowinger and the David versus
Goliath dynamic of  their struggle. In a telling revelation of  how antagonistic
restaurants had become towards organized workers, the chief  of  the BC
Restaurant and Foodservice Organization, the provincial employers’ group, was
quoted as calling the certification “obviously disappointing.” Relations had
changed from the more cooperative attitude between restaurateurs and unions
that existed in the 1950s and 60s, when unionism in BC restaurants was not
uncommon.25 He was quick to reassure other bosses that Squamish was “not a
trend. It’s optimistic for them to think that it is.”26
The Vancouver Province’s editorial board also raised the usual spectres in
response to the CAW victory. According to the Province, this action by a few
workers at one of  hundreds of  BC McDonalds’ threatened the economic future
of  the entire province. Saying that the victory would be an inspiration to organ-
izers and workers across BC, the newspaper paused to worry about the people
“who want to invest their money somewhere…. Will they look at BC, freeze at
the thought of  this precedent and then take their business elsewhere?” While the
Province congratulated the Squamish workers on their victory, its conclusion both
demeaned their work and age, portraying them as something less than actual
workers worthy of  having their concerns addressed seriously. The statement that
“these kids are flipping burgers, and many aren’t in it for the long haul. Isn’t the
job itself  enough?” raises some obvious questions.  If  these “kids” were only
“flipping burgers,” how could their unionization be “D-Day for the health of
British Columbia,” an action so radical and far-reaching that it would drive away
outside investment and plunge the province into recession? While the Province
would not engage with fast food work seriously, it did seem seriously concerned
that workers and unions might.27
The frenzied media speculation was premature. Before Wiebe,
Lowinger, and CAW 3000 could torpedo the BC economy, they would have to
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move beyond certification and become the only union in North America to sign
a collective agreement with McDonald’s. Negotiations began in September, and
immediately bogged down in the face of  employer intransigence. On the face of
it, the workers’ demands were modest: a small wage increase, some employee
benefits, seniority considered in scheduling, and an anti-harassment policy. The
real goal was to solidify the union as a viable bargaining unit. But to McDonald’s,
the demand for a collective agreement was outrageous in itself. Savage and The
corporation  endeavored to slow the process to a halt. This would be the corner-
stone of  their method to remain union-free.28
Why was McDonald’s so determined to keep the union out? As many
scholars have pointed out, unionization is a direct challenge to the McDonald’s
model on several levels. While scholars are right to criticize George Ritzer’s theo-
ry of  McDonaldization, (that McDonald’s process of  rationalization is creating
an increasingly homogenous yet unstable world), as insufficiently attentive to
local differences, none disagree with his observation that McDonald’s attempts
to operate along standard lines globally as much as possible.29 Royle and Tarwar
have both observed that McDonald’s desires a high level of  worker identifica-
tion, a reason why paternalistic managerial relations are encouraged to wed work-
ers to McDonald’s processes. This is necessary to win the consent of  workers of
whom sociologists Julia R. Woodhall and Alicia Muzsynski conclude: “experience
the worst of  both the Fordist and post-Fordist models. They participate in a pre-
carious, flexible job market, which is said to alleviate some of  the problems of
Fordism. However, the actual labour and daily operations performed by these
workers is organized along Fordist lines, forcing participation in alienating
work.”30
A trade union in the workplace would challenge this mode of  work
organization. It would contest the power of  McDonald’s to manage production
and service by fiat, especially in the realm of  scheduling how many hours to give
employees and how many employees to use per shift, so key to managing labour
costs. It would also push for higher wages. Finally, the union itself  would present
an alternate focus for employee affinity, which runs counter to management
strategy. The desire among McDonald’s executives to remain anti-union extends
beyond their efforts to remain union-free in Canada, the United States, and the
UK. In countries like Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, where
McDonald’s has been forced to recognize various forms of  employee representa-
tion, the company has assiduously worked to marginalize these institutions and
keep as free a hand in employee relations and store operations as possible.31
Seeing unions as not only a threat to profits and managerial prerogatives, but to
the very operations model that has underpinned the chain’s success, McDonald’s
was always going to be a determined adversary of  unionization in Squamish.
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After weeks of  desultory negotiations, Crowther held a successful strike
vote to try to jump-start the proceedings, maintain union solidarity, and give the
bargaining committee a strong mandate.  By March, after eight months of  nego-
tiations with mediator Jim Breckenridge, a settlement package was on the table.
Crowther was disappointed by the workers’ emphasis on fair treatment, as
opposed to a more equitable pay package, but noted the workers had already
won their anti-harassment and seniority provisions, “legal rights in the workplace
that no other employees at McDonald’s [have].”32 The Squamish workers voted
100 per cent in favour of  the contract, but McDonald’s had other ideas.  Instead
of  accepting the mediated agreement, they petitioned the Labour Board to allow
the parties to proceed to a strike or lockout, in hopes of  a decertification battle.
Their refusal to accept a mediated settlement indicates that their initial strategy,
to play for time until they could destroy the union, had not changed since the
first certification vote.
Crowther and the local CAW leadership attempted to keep workers
onside throughout what became a negotiating marathon by stressing the gains
the union had made for workers at organized fast-food outlets elsewhere. In a
notice posted to employees explaining the purpose of  the strike vote, Crowther
claimed that, “it is agreed by most observers that the CAW/KFC contract cover-
ing 47 KFC restaurants is the leading fast food contract is [sic] North America.
The start rate is $8.07 per hour.” In comparison, BC’s minimum wage was $7.15
in 1998. However, Crowther well knew that these restaurants were organized at a
much earlier time, and the union then had possessed two advantages, the corpo-
rate ownership of  those KFCs and the union density provided by the 1973 blan-
ket certification and later master agreement, that were not in place in organizing
the Squamish McDonald’s.33 Meanwhile, McDonald’s argued before the Labour
Relations Board (LRB) that the strike vote was invalid. Because workers were
told that there would necessarily be another vote before strike action, they held
that this vote was administrative in nature, and therefore meaningless. While the
appeal was yet another stalling tactic dismissed by the LRB due to lack of  merit,
the testimony provided contains valuable information about the campaign.34
A review of  the Board’s decision demonstrates that Local 3000 leaders
did a good job of  providing information to its members, largely teenagers with
little trade union experience. One worker, Joe Mahlberg “agreed that the Union
provided several reasons why employees should vote "yes". These reasons
included sending a message to the Employer that the employees were serious;
moving along negotiations; and accessing the Section 55 mediation
process.”35Organizers also tried to soothe employees who had learned of
McDonald’s reaction to successful unionization, as the threat of  a shutdown was
a common scare tactic during a union drive. Crowther reassured them in a handout that
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“the company stated once again in front of the mediator – they will not close the restau-
rant. Don’t listen to rumours or those who are not at the bargaining table.”36
LRB testimony indicates that many workers were not persuaded by the threats of
closure. Discussing the strike vote meeting, worker Kirsten Albrighton testified, “The
employees smiled when Lowinger asked if  they believed that the restaurant would close
and laughed when she asked if  anyone believed that "bad things" would happen.”37
However, these reassurances show the union understood that keeping workers together
would be even more difficult than the initial organization.  This was especially true for
workers with little security to begin with. Simple fatigue with a drawn-out, complicated
process was another hurdle for workers and organizers. Albrighton’s testimony touches on
both of these themes: “she felt that the employees were scared and that Lowinger reas-
sured them that they would not likely go on strike. She felt that a "yes" vote would "speed
things up" and "get it over with" as the "kids were bored with it."38
Crowther and CAW organizer Denise Kellahan also attempted to drive home
who bore responsibility for the numerous challenges and delays, reminding workers that the
dispute was with Savage, but also with the powerful corporation behind him. In one
update, the CAW noted that of the union’s demands, Savage’s lawyer only objected to a
laundry allowance and a higher start rate. Crowther and Kellahan asked “If we are only
dealing with the franchise owner, why the worry…? They have spent thousands of dollars
in legal fees just to prevent a higher start rate? Who is really calling the shots here?”39 The
union repeatedly demanded to know who was paying Savage’s legal fees, estimated at half a
million dollars by the end of the dispute. Savage claimed loans and pro bonowork were car-
rying the load.
In his own series of notices to employees, Savage attempted to sow fear and dis-
sent. He pointed out that the mediator could pursue several options, including granting par-
ties their right to a strike or lockout, raising fears that a contract was really no closer.  In his
handouts to employees, Savage also warned of union red tape, saying the union’s proposals
would result in “less [sic] employees and far less flexibility than we currently have.”40 He
reiterated that the restaurant was in poor financial shape, a claim he said the union had
agreed with. Implicit in statements such as “it may be hard to believe the restaurant is per-
forming so poorly” or “this business has to turn around and become profitable” is the
threat of closure in an “intensely competitive” market like Squamish.41 Even the pro-busi-
ness Globe and Mailwas skeptical of Savage’s tales of financial distress, writing that, because
of its location on a major highway and near a high school, the Squamish outlet was “reput-
ed to be the third most prosperous in British Columbia.”42
Furthermore, some of Savage’s losses and his lower per shift profit averages were
not based on normal operations, but on his attempts to buy his way out of his union prob-
lem, according to both Kellahan and a Globe and Mail article on the dispute.  Kellahan
claimed that during the drive, Savage followed a policy of placating young employees by
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vastly over-scheduling workers per shift, allowing them a chance to earn more money in a
very social atmosphere, with much less work to do. This was an attempt to chip away at
pro-union sentiment by making him over into a friendly boss who made McDonald’s a fun
workplace.43 Savage and his team of new managers and advisers also responded to union-
ization by fixing the electrical outlets, holding meetings to hear grievances, and buying a new
staff room stereo. They showered staff with free pins, meals, and banana splits. Worker
Dan Duggan noted, “if it was always like that, I wouldn’t be for the union.”44
Indeed, throughout the dispute Savage countered the union’s rhetoric of brother-
hood and sisterhood with his paternalism. In addition to parties and social shifts jammed
with employees, he tried to inculcate a family feeling in his notices. One relates his pride in
his workers graduating from high school, concluding that “Watching our students succeed
at school and at work is one of the big reasons I enjoy operating this restaurant.”45 Another
notice began brightly, talking about the “great time” Savage had at the Christmas party
where “everyone was enjoying themselves.” “Unfortunately,” the letter continues, “I have to
respond once again to the recent question and answer from Denise Kellahan.”46 Here
Savage shrewdly constructed himself as a friendly boss who could provide fun for every-
one, if  the union would just stop interfering.
This paternal discourse was combined with continued obstruction. When his
appeal of the strike vote was rejected by the LRB, Savage next claimed that employees did
not have “adequate time” to decide. One union employee, Ben Thompson, claimed that
only 15 of 85 employees had participated in the strike vote. In fact, since certification,
Savage’s McDonald’s had undertaken a churn of its employees. Pro-union workers had
their hours cut as an incentive to leave. New anti-union workers were hired, with opposi-
tion to CAW 3000 purportedly a condition for employment. Reiter claims that 28 new
employees were hired immediately after the certification application; while the exact timing
and scale of the new hiring is elusive, it seems almost certain that diluting the pool of dis-
gruntled, pro-union employees was a key part of Savage’s strategy.47 Though it is uncertain
how many employees participated, it was reported that at least 18 boycotted the vote,
meaning many more anti-union employees were at the store.48 Despite this, even employ-
ees testifying in favour of Savage agreed that the strike vote meeting was clear, informative,
and free of harassment or coercion. Again, the practices of the union were proven to be
legal and transparent, despite the rhetoric of Savage and McDonald’s.
The dispute dragged on. High turnover at the restaurant and the deep pockets
and rabid anti-unionism of McDonald’s shifted the advantage to the employer. While the
Labour Relations Board upheld the original strike vote and upheld it again on appeal, one
piece of BC labour law dealt a critical blow to the fight to obtain a collective agreement.
BC law allowed decertification, a vote to disband the union, to proceed just 10 months after
the union had been certified. Unlike Ontario law, which mandated that at least one collective
agreement being signed before a decertification, workers in BC could decertify
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without even having the chance to see the pros and cons ofworking with a union
contract.49This provision made it possible for Savage and McDonald’s to stall
and flood the workplace with pro-management workers to wait the union out
and prepare for a decertification vote without bargaining seriously. Crowther and
Kellahan alleged that was what had happened. On 3 July 1999, a vote took place,
with 45 workers voting for and 25 against decertification. Over 50% of  the vot-
ers had not been working there just 10 months earlier, when the union drive
took place.
The varied reactions of  workers were an apt reflection of  their now-
bitterly divided workplace. Some, like Jenn Thiele, clearly believed the Savage-
McDonald’s line, saying “if  we get the union then McDonald's will buy out
[owner] Paul Savage and [the workers] will lose their jobs." Kris Pienatkowski
seemed to believe that the union was unnecessary to ensure lasting changes at
his workplace. He predicted hopefully, "I think that having this thing, it scared
them. Now they are going to treat us good, because we have power to do
stuff."50 Joe Mahlberg, the 19-year-old employee who was the face of  the anti-
union campaign, exulted in the result, saying, “We finally got our say. We've been
heard. We'd like to see the union pack up and march away."51
Mahlberg’s comments indicate another key weakness in the traditional
collective bargaining model as it applies to the fast food industry. It is immensely
difficult for workplace leaders and outside organizers to keep all workers onside
during a long and difficult fight against an employer, particularly one that is will-
ing to make positive changes to the workplace in order to stay union-free. The
ability of  the employer to play divide and conquer among young workers in a
high turnover industry has been a consistent obstacle for attempts to unionize in
this sector. Organizations that have the capacity to help those workers who wish
to change their working conditions while not requiring the consent of  most
members to support that activism may offer a way past this common impasse.
Wiebe and Lowinger were crushed, but still claimed a partial victory,
and expressed optimism that their struggle would be taken up by other workers.
"Of  course I'm disappointed," Lowinger commented. "I don't understand what
people wanted, why they thought they had no right to health and safety and to
be treated fairly." Despite her obvious frustration, Lowinger concluded with a
message of  hope: "Don't let this discourage you," Lowinger said. "If  more peo-
ple try, then one day McDonald's is going to be union."52
At this writing, the Squamish outlet remains operating and non-union-
ized, like every other McDonald’s location in North America. Reflecting on the
dispute, which he was involved with from an early stage, CAW youth organizer
and former White Spot worker Ryan Krell opined that, "one of  two things hap-
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pens when an employer finds out about an organizing campaign. They call
lawyers or they go ballistic, immediately harassing and disciplining employees
unjustly. Of  the two methods, lawyers and union-busting consultants are far
more effective because they can turn the workers against one another."53 These
were the tactics used by McDonald’s in all three Canadian union campaigns they
thwarted in the 1990s.
Why was the union drive in Squamish defeated? Should Local 3000
have done better? If  the union can be faulted, perhaps its tactics were too tradi-
tional. The Squamish campaign was a classic example of  a “hot-shop” campaign,
where organizers respond to grievances at a workplace and attempt to help
translate those dynamics into a union certification and negotiated contract. The
unions who have grown fastest in the past three decades, such as the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) or HERE, have increasingly abandoned
this approach in favour of  comprehensive campaigns.54 While no two compre-
hensive campaigns are identical, common tactics include bringing the issue to
political leaders, attacking the corporation on matters apart from the affected
workplace, and mobilizing rank-and-file workers and the wider community to
force capital to the table. Despite the strong union tradition in Squamish, Local
3000 did not seriously attempt to mobilize the community, nor did it prevail
upon the local government or the provincial NDP to try to break McDonald’s
stalling tactics. While it is unclear how effective this approach would have been –
a local boycott may not have had much impact at a restaurant beside a major
highway reliant on transient business, and the NDP may have been unwilling to
intervene – it certainly may have kept momentum going and increased the pres-
sure on McDonald’s.
However, any errors made by the union were not decisive factors in the
failure to win a first contract. In any campaign featuring such a disparity in
resources between workers and management, particularly in a high turnover
industry, speed is critical for success. The fact that BC labour laws allowed man-
agement to stall and make a farce of  negotiations, all the while replacing workers
with anti-union hires, represented a failure of  provincial law in the face of  an
embattled labour movement, and a prevailing pro-business hegemony, not of
Local 3000. However, the defeat has put a chill on the local’s restaurant organiz-
ing efforts, though it continues to represent many restaurant workers in BC.
The effort to organize the Squamish McDonald’s did not live and die in
silence.  Like the other attempts to organize McDonald’s franchises it attracted
ample publicity for the union movement and for the grievances of  fast food
workers. The amount of  investment in branding undertaken by multinationals
allows for a certain amount of  asymmetrical warfare by smaller adversaries.55
Their branding is so conspicuous and so key to their endeavors and financial
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health that these types of  campaigns are highly visible. At the level of  econom-
ics, however, the resources of  multinationals and the unsympathetic climate of
BC labour law, the result of  business lobbying and anti-labour governments,
have stymied unionization efforts.
Another reason why the organizing drive at Squamish failed was the
franchise model under which the outlet operated. Analysts of  McDonald’s have
concluded that the franchise model at McDonald’s produces not a ”loose federa-
tion” of  independent franchisees but direct control by the corporation. Under its
agreements with its franchisees, McDonald’s retains the power to revoke fran-
chises for any violation of  its operating code. This includes labour relations, the
standards of  which are set by senior managers at head office. Franchisees are
thus highly motivated to satisfy corporate management, both to retain their busi-
ness and to have the opportunity to run additional franchises in their region.
They also experience high levels of  training and surveillance by McDonald’s. In
the 1970s, franchisees created a McDonald’s Operators Association to address
many grievances they had with the corporation. While the organization quickly
foundered after McDonald’s addressed some of  the complaints, the event is a
telling illustration of  the labour/management-style dynamic that has existed.
Royle points out that former McDonald’s owner Ray Kroc’s innovation was to
transform fast food franchising from a quick sale of  recipes and trademarks (like
Nat Bailey’s purchase of  the BC KFC rights from Colonel Sanders) to a long-
term, micro-managed relationship in which single restaurant licenses were sold,
not territorial rights. In doing so, Kroc created “a club” to hold over the heads
of  franchise operators. For a franchisee facing a union drive, like Savage, the
prospect of  that club descending was likely very real and very urgent.56
However, during the 1998 campaign few observers were able to parse
the labour-management relationship at McDonald’s, and thus the franchise sys-
tem provided an effective rhetorical weapon for Savage. Some might scoff  at
Fraser Institute head Michael Walker’s take on the dispute, that “Very often,
unionization sounds the death knell for small businesses,”57 but such a character-
ization was not entirely baseless.  Despite owning an outlet of  the richest restau-
rant chain on the planet, Savage was able to portray himself  as a small business-
man taking on a big union, and thus deflect some of  the stigma of  an unscrupu-
lous owner fighting to deny rights from his teenage workforce.   Furthermore,
his claims of  financial losses, incurred as part of  the anti-union strategy, were
much more credible as an owner-operator, than as part of  McDonald’s, the
world’s largest restaurant conglomerate. The McDonald’s corporation, of  course,
would have had neither advantage in fighting a drive at a company-owned store.
Accounts of  chain-wide losses would have been ludicrous, and the company
could easily be portrayed as a faceless corporate giant crushing plucky local
teenage workers. The remarks of  Mahlberg and other employees after the drive’s
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failure signal that Savage’s rhetoric, coupled with his self-presentation as a friend-
ly boss trying to work things out with his employees without outside interfer-
ence, resonated with enough workers to win the decertification vote. However,
his success in halting the drive was fundamentally a simple matter of  stalling to
gain the advantages conferred by economics and staff  turnover. Therefore, the
BC labour relations regime was not adequate to serve to the clear desire of
workers to unionize their McDonald’s and reach a collective agreement with their
employer.
However, other labour law codes around the world, including many that
seem more favourable to workers and unions, have done little to encourage
meaningful workplace representation at McDonald’s. Sectoral bargaining and
some form of  automatic workplace representation have been applied to
McDonald’s in many European countries, but the company has largely effectively
stymied any real bargaining in its European outlets. This indicates that real work-
er rights at McDonald’s are not something that can simply be legislated from
above. Surveying the global situation, Royle and Towers conclude that “whatever
the systems of  employee representation in countries….  large [Multinational
Corporations] have been able to tame, neutralize, or subvert these systems, par-
ticularly at the workplace level.”58 The correct combination of  legal framework
and union strategy remains elusive in the fast food workplace.59
The contrasting success of  Local 3000 in organizing Vancouver
Starbucks locations the previous year throws the differences in organizing a cor-
porate chain, as opposed to a franchise, into sharp relief. At Starbucks, all outlets
were owned directly by the corporation. The CAW had an easier time pressuring
the chain, applying resources at several locations and eventually organizing them
into a master agreement, similar to the one operating at White Spot and KFC.
These provide a huge boost to unionization because instead of  having to fight to
establish a new local for each outlet, locations can be quickly added to a broad
certification.60 However, the ultimate decertification of  these unions further
underlines the difficulty of  using conventional bargaining to make lasting
changes in the industry workplace, whether facing a corporate head office or an
individual franchisee across the table.
Starbucks was also an easier target because of  its brand positioning.
The company has self-consciously modeled an upscale, quasi-hip image since its
inception. Part of  that image included marketing itself  as an ethical employer. As
Laurie Bonang, one of  the Vancouver union organizers recalled, “I applied at
Starbucks. I could get benefits.  It was a really neat, trendy company to work for.
I could say, ‘I work at Starbucks, aren't you jealous of  me?’ But over time I could
see that it [benefits, etc.] was a bone they could throw to us to keep us happy.
When they could do so much more.”61 Starbucks’s benefits, so good for public
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relations, rebounded on the corporation. Emboldened workers, who possessed a
small measure of  job stability because of  Starbucks’s lower-turnover philosophy,
pushed the company to live up to its promises. McDonald’s and other fast food
restaurants have chosen to make no such offers, subtly promoting the discourse
in their advertising that their workers are “kids” who aren’t really working real
jobs. Ten years after Squamish, this strategy continues to work effectively for the
burger behemoths.
Nevertheless, the labour movement needs to fight for and attract fast
food workers if  it wishes to reverse its declining fortunes. Because of  their
youth, their numbers, their exploitation, and the fact that many are in their first
jobs, they are exactly where labour needs to be. However, it is undeniable that,
despite some fleeting successes, the mainstream unions have been an ineffective
vehicle for organizing and defending the rights of  service workers. This is espe-
cially true at the fast food multinationals that have achieved a hegemonic posi-
tion in the restaurant industry since their advent in the 1950s.
The issues faced by the CAW in Squamish are not confined to the fast
food sector, but are common in struggles to organize precarious work at high-
profile employers. Wal-Mart, now the world’s largest company as measured by
annual revenues and number of  employees, is a major recent organizing target of
the CLC and UFCW.  Battles to organize Wal-Marts, especially in Jonquiere,
Quebec, where the company closed down an outlet to thwart a successful union
bid, have mirrored the union-busting techniques perfected by McDonald’s and
the other fast food giants.62 It is clear that the McDonald’s model is becoming
the reality for more workers, not fewer. It is equally clear that traditional organiz-
ing strategies are ineffective here. What does this mean for labour scholars. For
labour itself ?
Wal-Mart’s rise to the top of  the global corporate structure represents
the final death knell of  postwar Fordism, especially its paternalistic offer of  sta-
bility for workers in exchange for political moderation and constantly rising pro-
duction. It has been replaced by the installation of  the labour principles – low
wages, instability, surveillance, and intimidation - experienced by fast food work-
ers since at least the 1970s. Workers in BC responded by building Local 3000,
but they are a notable exception. These practices have become the bedrock of
capital’s approach to labour in the service industry and throughout the Canadian
economy. As Leah Vosko states, “Precarious employment is a defining feature of
the Canadian labour market, yet it is poorly understood and the consequences
are far reaching. They include our inability to apprehend the nature of  and scope
of  labour market insecurity, misdiagnoses of  work-related sources of  ill health,
the growing misfit between labour law and policy and workers in need of  protec-
tion, and legal and institutional obstacles inhibiting vulnerable members of  soci-
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ety from expressing their voices collectively.”63 Fast food is an important type of
labour that historians and other scholars must reckon with in order to under-
stand the growing exploitation of  workers in an economy built on precarious
labour.
Where do fast food workers go from here? During the past two
decades, labour scholars and union activists alike in both Canada the United
States have vigorously debated how to reverse decades of  declining unionization
rates. In the first chapter of  Kate Bronfenbrenner a visible and important rela-
tionship with’s pathbreaking book Organizing to Win: New Research on Union
Strategies, Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich called for organizing tactics that
engaged rank-and-file workers as leaders, creatively and aggressively pressured
employers on multiple fronts away from the workplace, and effectively engaged
other community organizations – what is now commonly known as social union-
ism or social movement unionism.64 In his Restoring The Power of  Unions, labour
historian Julius Getman analyzes the history and strategy of  HERE, probably
the most effective social movement union. Getman concludes that the compre-
hensive campaigns pioneered by HERE are the only realistic option for organiz-
ing new workers: “the union learned… that organizing is a complex process and
that at its heart is the mobilization of  the membership and the application of
relentless pressure to recalcitrant employers.”65 Undoubtedly, HERE has had
some notable organizing successes using comprehensive campaigns, especially in
the hotel sector.
However, social unionism is not without its detractors. Labour journal-
ist Steve Early has tenaciously criticized SEIU, one of  the unions represented in
Bronfenbrenner’s book and North America’s fastest-growing union, for negotiat-
ing sweetheart contracts with employers, ignoring the real concerns of  rank and
file workers, and suppressing democracy and worker engagement with top-down
control, often through the method of  union trusteeships. Getman is also critical
of  SEIU for raiding HERE.66 While HERE appears to offer a powerful count-
er-example of  a union that has balanced growth with adherence to democratic,
worker-led principles, constant vigilance is required to ensure that the concerns
of  workers are not bypassed by unions seeking to expand by any means neces-
sary.
Canadian social unionism has been accused of  an overreliance on legal
panaceas and a fundamental conservatism. In reviewing social unionism in the
agricultural sector, Butovsky and Smith argue that “The social unionist official
can "talk the talk" (and often with great passion and urgency) but fails to "walk
the walk," relying on litigation and electoral activity in support of  the New
Democratic Party that promise, at best, a glacial pace of  social change.”67 David
Camfield cautions against solutions designed to pump new blood into tiring
Learning on the Job 71
Quark 16_1 final_Quark 16.1.qxd  14-05-14  11:03 AM  Page 71
unions, insisting that motivation should derive not from “revitalizing the move-
ment” but rather from “directly impacting day to day lives,” starting with work-
ers’ concerns and “actually existing worker’s resistance.”68
For those interested in increasing the power of  fast food workers, such
concerns of  principle and philosophy, while important, are overshadowed by the
prosaic reservation that social unionism and comprehensive campaigns may sim-
ply not be effective in fast food workplaces. Lowinger, Wiebe, and CAW 3000,
were able to certify a union at the Squamish McDonald’s without the techniques
of  social unionism. Where they were stymied was in negotiating a contract.
Could a comprehensive campaign have secured an agreement, or would
McDonald’s have stood firm, using the shield of  franchise ownership to deflect
pressure while counting on turnover to destabilize the certification? Getman
rightly notes many of  the successes HERE have had in organizing hotels, casi-
nos, and university cleaning staffs thought previously unorganizable. 
However, those workplaces require far more employees, accounting for
a great deal of  local economic activity in their communities and thus having
commensurately sized obligations and needs from local government. Would sim-
ilar pressure or community interest exist at an independently owned McDonald’s
that employs 30 to 40 workers? During the Squamish campaign, Bryan Palmer
noted that the dues money and political power gained by organizing fast food
workers was limited. He also observed "You spend all your money organizing
one branch, employers can close it down, and move employees around," said
Palmer. "You can't do that with an auto plant."69
Furthermore, community support in a restaurant strike is no guarantee
of  success. In their discussions of  the 1978-83 Muckamuck restaurant labour
dispute, both Smith and Nicol detail the wealth of  support the strikers received
from organized labour, supportive locals, and aboriginal communities (most
workers at the restaurant, which served aboriginal cuisine, were First Nations).
Nevertheless, the strike failed in the face of  employer intransigence, high
turnover, and a labour relations board that consistently stalled on employer viola-
tions while quickly punishing the union for picketing infractions. Detroit’s
ACORN-backed United Labor Unions used similar strategies in an effort to
organize fast food workers in the early-1980s. Despite widespread labour and
community support and worker enthusiasm, the attempt was defeated by
employer resistance and high employee turnover.70
In their introduction to Organizing to Win, Bronfenbrenner et al refer to
a small body of  case study literature analyzing how and why organizing cam-
paigns succeed or fail. This study of  the Squamish campaign can be added to
that body, and it indicates that the methods of  social unionism, while effective in
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some settings, may not work for fast food workers. Even if  done with the best
intentions, it is still unproven that the methods of  organization and negotiation
pioneered by HERE can deliver results for the precariously employed workers of
the fast food sector. The strongest piece of  evidence pointing to this conclusion
is the stark fact that these methods have yet to be successfully used in obtaining
a union contract at a single fast food restaurant in North America. Changing this
would require a militant, massive campaign aimed at simultaneously organizing
every outlet of  a particular chain in a particular area, supported by a mass media
campaign, mobilization of  a variety of  different unions, and boycotts.
Even then, success is far from guaranteed, and it is doubtful whether
mainstream unions would harness the amount of  resources this would require to
organize workers at unstable jobs at a relative handful of  small outlets. If  organi-
zation were successful, securing first contracts would be an even larger battle,
requiring a greater and longer-lasting mobilization. Getman quotes Jeff  Fiedler,
“the guru of  the comprehensive campaign” dismissing the legal environment of
organization by insisting that, “the Board is irrelevant to me. If  the workers want
to organize and you understand the company, you can win.”71 Clearly, there have
been many groups of  fast food workers who have wanted to organize. Perhaps
mainstream unions have failed to understand fast food companies, and the
strategies needed to organize them.
Fortunately, both scholars and activists are exploring a variety of  differ-
ent worker organizations in an attempt to overcome the obstacles to organizing
for fast food and other precarious service sector workers. Wade Rathke, in his
study of  organizing possibilities at Wal-Mart, calls for a minority unionism not
tied to collective bargaining, but to building a critical mass of  present and past
workers. These organizations can give workers experience in building move-
ments, direct democracy, combating capital, and developing leaders. Writes
Rathke, “Building an organization has always been the prelude, not the conse-
quence, of  collective bargaining.”72
Minority unionism is a non-statutory form of  organizing in which only
those workers who wish to participate are union members. No certification is
required for the union to act at the workplace; conversely, the members have
none of  the legal protections extended to a traditional union in the midst of  an
organizing campaign. These “Members only,” voluntary, not mandatory, unions
are still provided for in US law. Legal scholar Charles Morris is a prominent
advocate of  minority unionism in the United States. His book The Blue Eagle at
Work: Reclaiming Democracy in the American Workplace, argues that the National
Labor Relations Act (NRLA) requires employers to negotiate with groups of
employees (not unions). To Morris, the minority unionism that the act provides
for has the potential to “provide the basis for a vibrant and flexible system of
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employee relations in which the voices of  organized workers… provide a healthy
dose of  countervailing economic and power.”73 In 2001, the Canadian Supreme
Court ruled that the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms protects a work-
er’s right to a representative body in the workplace, which seemed to underline
the promise of  this strategic option for Canadian workers. In Canada, labour
scholar Roy Adams is the leading voice arguing for a change in the orientation of
labour organization from what he calls a “Wagner Act model,” based on the
Rand formula and certified exclusive bargaining representation, to “I-Mode”: a
model of  organizing workers based on human rights and Canada’s international
treaty commitments ro increasing worker representation. 74
Claiming that “survey evidence indicates that many employees prefer
informal non-statutory collective representation over certified exclusive
agency,”75 Adams argues that unions must abandon their insistence on the tradi-
tional mechanisms of  organizing and negotiation, and become willing to
embrace works councils, employee representatives, and other non-exclusive
forms of  representation. How promising an option is this for fast food workers?
Adams repeatedly cites his McMaster University faculty association as an effec-
tive employee organization. Of  course, tenured faculty members have a level of
power and security in the work force several orders above what a fast food work-
er does, making his association an extremely poor example for the utility of  this
model in the wider workforce. Adams recognizes this point, but does not consid-
er that, irrespective of  the successes of  McMaster’s tenured faculty, academic
labour in Canada is now more insecure, precarious, and casualized than ever
before.76 As to works councils, we have already observed their ineffectiveness as
a vehicle for the aspirations of  fast food workers in Europe.
Indeed, serious doubts have been raised about the entire intellectual
project of  basing trade unionism in liberal concepts of  rights through court rul-
ings and legislation, rather than working-class power at the point of  production.
Dunmore v. Ontario, the ruling heralded by Adams as clearing the way for worker
representation in agriculture, was dismissed as weak gruel by Butovsky and
Smith, who point out that neither collective bargaining or the strike weapon were
protected by the court’s decision. They call the Agricultural Employees
Protection Act, the Conservative government’s response to the court ruling, a
“supremely cynical piece of  legislation permitting farm workers to form tooth-
less "associations," without requiring employers to recognize them. The upshot
was that agribusiness remained entirely free from any legal obligation to bargain
collectively with its employees.”77 A 2011 decision by the Supreme Court of
upheld the ALEA as constitutional, and seems to affirm that collective bargain-
ing and the right to strike are not protected.78 It is not certain, then, that the
protections offered by the courts, which are based on perceived worker vulnera-
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bility, not working class strength, are useful in stimulating real organizing in sec-
tors like agriculture or fast food. Eric Tucker argues, for example, that legal
rights based on vulnerability are intrinsically unstable, for the courts will reverse
them as soon as these workers gain strength.79
Adams’s concepts of  non-traditional organizing have also been criti-
cized as a dangerous reorientation of  workers’ energy away from struggle and
the development of  working-class power towards a passive reformism dependent
on sympathetic governments or favourable court rulings. Larry Savage asserts
that rights-based organizing “downplay[s] or altogether ignore[s] the material
dimension of  collective worker action and the central role of  economic conflict
in the employment relationship”80 that may garner some “symbolic victories”
but “has done very little to change the balance of  class forces in Canada.”81
While Savage raises many important reservations, I would again submit that the
fatal flaw in Adams’ formulation of  right-based organizing is its unfeasibility. He
offers no realistic scenario for how the major shifts in the orientations of  the
forces of  capital, labour, and the state necessary for its realization would take
place. 
For instance, Adams advocates that the three form a tripartite council
in order to plan how Canada would meet its international labour obligations,
when, as Savage observes, there is no evidence of  any desire to do so on the
part of  any of  the parties. Nor is there any suggestion from Adams as to how
this desire would be stimulated. In response to Savage’s criticisms, Adams argues
that the victories of  the new social movements offer a template for workers to
follow in pursuing rights-based labour relations. The labour movement and its
allies should press home a moral campaign: “The notion of  the union-free work-
place is as morally reprehensible as “separate but equal” and “a woman’s place is
in the home.” Drawing on international human rights standards, the civil rights
movement and the women’s rights movements were able to mount vigorous
campaigns against those discredited notions.”82 Yet again, no suggestions are
given about how this campaign would emerge or be waged, giving the impres-
sion he has reached for a convenient comparison rather than deeply considering
the real and complex political and historical moments that those movements
responded to and whether they hold relevance for this situation. Furthermore,
there is no consideration of  how labour and workers’ experiences are profoundly
gendered and racialized.
Still, Adams is to be commended for trying to find new solutions to an
impasse that continually frustrates precarious workers, like those in Squamish,
from organizing to improve their working lives. While Savage rightfully places
class conflict and power at the centre of  the organization question, his own pro-
posed solutions: “Organizing precarious part-time workers in the service sector
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is not impossible, but does require a long-term strategic vision and plan involv-
ing multiple unions. Extending collective bargaining rights to workers through
any number of  non-statutory schemes is no replacement for organizing workers
into real unions” lack concrete suggestions for future practice.83 Currently, sever-
al new models of  worker organization are emerging. In the remainder of  this
paper we will consider some of  them and evaluate whether they might offer
solutions for organizing precariously employed workers.
The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) is one traditional
union that is heavily involved in new ways of  engaging workers in the low-wage
economy. It has experimented with members-only unionism by backing Wal-
Mart Workers for Change, an organization that is open to all Wal-Mart workers
past and present. By gathering workers into representative organizations, it hopes
to build a critical mass and then organize these workers into more traditional
union structures. The UFCW is also responding to a developing phenomenon in
Canada’s low-wage economy: the increased reliance by major corporations on
migrant contract labour, and the violation of  those contracts. It has been active
in working with migrant farmworkers in BC, along with grassroots groups like
Justicia for Migrant Workers.84
The UFCW has also expanded its support of  migrant workers into the
restaurant sector. The union is currently backing a $10 million dollar class-action
lawsuit against Denny’s Canada by a group of  Filipino migrant workers who
claim their contracts were violated by Denny’s. As the use of  migrant workers in
the fast-food and restaurant sector becomes more and more common in Canada,
alliances between migrant worker groups and the labour movement are one way
that legal and political pressure can be used to increase representation of  these
workers. Unions need to engage these workers, and organize across lines of  citi-
zenship. Butovsky and Smith suggest that labour should strongly demand full cit-
izenship for all foreign workers, regardless of  how they arrived here: “such a
drive could unite Canadian and migrant workers in a common struggle against
the split labour market and for significant improvements in wages and working
conditions.”85
Such a sweeping demand is beyond what the UFCW is currently advo-
cating. There are also very real questions about the UFCW’s record representing
service workers. In her book Cashing in on Pay Equity? Jan Kainer criticizes the
union for negotiating concessionary contracts with little resistance, being unde-
mocratic, and having little presence in the daily working lives of  its members.86
Are the UFCW’s efforts in this area a real mobilization of  migrants and service
workers, or are they a SEIU-style attempt to grow the membership and dues
payments from the top down, with little concern for democracy or social
change? 87
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Workers’ centres are another growing method of  organizing workers
without requiring a workplace majority or tying workers to one specific work-
place. While their structure and activities vary, centres generally offer referrals for
workers, create a place for workers to share knowledge, and support workers
seeking better treatment at their workplace. In Canada, the Toronto Workers
Action Centre and the Windsor Workers’ Action Centre are groups that combine
education and support for workers with community organization and legislative
pressure.
Often workers battle simply for employers to observe the minimum
health, safety and wage standards, both through direct action and political and
legal pressures. However, workers’ centres are also winning legislative victories
that expand workers’ rights. In New York, the Make the Road centre successfully
pushed for anti-wage theft ordinances. The Workers’ Defense Project in Austin
was able to convince the city to pass a law requiring employers to provide rest
breaks to increase safety. In Florida, a workers’ centre supported by the
Interfaith Worker Justice (IWJ) was able to get legislation enacted in Miami-Dade
County increasing the penalties for employers who steal their employees’ wages.
IWJ itself, which brings together people of  different religious faiths to press for
workers’ rights, is another example of  how unconventional organizing is creating
new coalitions. While evangelical Christian politics and pro-business labor poli-
cies have marched in lockstep in the US over the past three decades, IWJ is try-
ing to change that dynamic by uniting spiritual people of  different faiths who
believe in justice for working people.88
In the United States, the restaurant sector has its own workers’ centre.
Active in many cities across the United States, the Restaurant Opportunities
Center (ROC) supports restaurant workers in conflicts with employers, provides
training, and pushes for legislation that would benefit restaurant workers. An
example of  a recent success was Philadelphia City Council’s enactment of  an
ROC-backed bill that makes it illegal for credit card fees to be deducted from
tips left by customers. One server estimated the legislation would save her $1,300
per year.89
Labour scholar Janice Fine sees great value in workers’ centres. She
lauds them for training workers to assume leadership roles and raise their voice,
and finds they are effective at enforcing existing labour laws and improving
working conditions. Their bottom-up orientation ensures workers centres are, in
Camfield’s words “built on actually existing worker resistance” and “directly
impacting workers’ lives.” Fine calls for the traditional labour movement to be
more directly involved and supportive of  worker centres. However, this is a rela-
tionship that must be carefully negotiated; more layers of  bureaucracy may
impair the responsiveness and militancy that make the centres effective.90
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Strategies both old and new are at work in these emerging forms of
worker organization. One of  the best-known solidarity unions in the fast food
sector is the Starbucks Workers Union (SWU), affiliated with the Industrial
Workers of  the World (IWW). Like the Wobblies of  old, SWU workers do not
have to organize their entire workplace to receive support from the union, and
they carry their union card with them if  they transfer to a different outlets. The
SWU has won wage increases and more stable scheduling in Starbucks outlets in
New York and Chicago, in addition to improving health and safety conditions,
proving that a union doesn’t necessarily need to be the certified bargaining agent
in order to be a useful vehicle for workers. While traditional unionism at
Starbucks in BC ended when the union was decertified in 2007,91 the SWU con-
tinues to press the company for better wages and conditions.
The IWW has also led a high-profile unionization campaign at the
Minneapolis-St. Paul outlet of  sandwich chain Jimmy John’s. In this campaign,
the IWW is attempting to become the certified bargaining agent in the work-
place. This is an important step forward. As Julius Getman notes, US labour law
may view minority union agreements that apply only to members as discrimina-
tory, so it is important to engage the entire workforce whenever possible.
Getman also rightly cautions that minority unions that cannot claim to represent
the entire workforce will be significantly handicapped by their minority status
when negotiating with the employer.92 Minority unions may be a good starting
point for organization, but they should not be considered an end in themselves.
Therefore, the IWW’s attempt to build majority unions along democrat-
ic, worker-led principles is important and necessary. While the Jimmy John’s
Workers Union was unsuccessful in its first certification attempt, its activism
continues. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) upheld an appeal of  the
campaign’s narrow defeat, based on allegations of  unfair practices by the
employer. This grants the union another opportunity for a certification vote.
Workers’ innovative campaign to pressure the company into granting workers
sick days has garnered international attention. The NLRB has filed a legal com-
plaint against Jimmy John’s for firing six workers who participated in the sick
days campaign.93 Unlike workers centres, these examples of  radical unionism are
focused on building durable representation at specific workplaces. Also unlike
workers centres, they are unlikely to receive funding or support from the main-
stream labour movement (and it is unclear whether they would accept it). Their
politics of  radical direct action and hostility to business unionism ensure make
alliances problematic. Solidarity unions also lack the durability and deeper pock-
ets of  more mainstream unions.
The IWW principles of  solidarity unionism and direct action have com-
bined with the ideas of  community unionism and workers’ centres to create
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some interesting workers’ groups in the Pacific Northwest, where the Squamish
campaign was defeated. In Oregon, the Portland Restaurant Workers Association
(PRWA), a group open to all workers in this industry. The PWRA educates
workers about their rights, and fights for members who have experienced “illegal
or unethical” treatment. Like the ROCs, the PWRA also combines advocacy with
professional development, training workers in skills like knife work and wine
pairing in addition to its workplace action and outreach. It also connects workers
rights with the public through its Diners Alliance. If  a PWRA member is in con-
flict with their employer, an email alert is sent to Diner’s Alliance members
requesting they avoid patronizing that restaurant. This type of  community action
is reminiscent of  the community unionism Dorothy Sue Cobble identifies as key
to the success of  mid-century waitress unions.
Another IWW-allied group that has won several victories for workers in
the Northwest is the Seattle Solidarity Network (SeaSol). SeaSol is open to all
workers and tenants and uses direct action to remedy grievances, which typically
include wage theft, theft of  security deposits, and refusals to make repairs or
improve working conditions. After the group decides to tackle a particular issue,
they give a demand for restitution to the employer or landlord; if  the demands
are not met they picket and leaflet at their place of  business, home, or church.
These tactics are similar to how the IWJ has found success by notifying the faith
community of  recalcitrant employers of  their workers’ grievances. SeaSol has
won several cases in Seattle and inspired solidarity networks to form in Tacoma
and Vancouver. One important difference between the solidarity network model
and worker centres is that solidarity networks are conditional upon direct action
by the affected workers. If  SeaSol agrees to help a worker in an action, that
worker is obligated to participate in the action and help others fight their griev-
ances in the future. This emphasis on participatory action is intended to keep the
organization from becoming a bureaucratic service organization, which is a dan-
ger for worker centres as they grow in size and complexity.94
While these new options for worker activism are growing, they are still
in a fairly embryonic stage. As Fine cautions, their growth would create new
challenges, and it remains to be seen whether these less formal, less funded
forms of  workplace action will have the durability and adaptability necessary to
help win lasting gains for low-wage workers. SWU leader Daniel Gross points
out other issues that apply to many of  these groups: they lack a stable structure
that might provide durability, and their dependence on continuous member
mobilization, in one sense a strength, also raises fears of  burnout. However, it is
instructive and encouraging that many of  these groups have found ways around
the problems that stymied Wiebe and Lowinger, and so many other workers in
the fast food industry. Their low overhead and grassroots nature make them
responsive to the grievances of  fast food workers. Low-wage service workers are
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the focus of  their efforts, not a sideline for a manufacturing-focused union. The
ability to take representation from job to job sidesteps some of  the problems of
turnover, and gives workers options no matter where they work.
Minority unionism also allows workers to begin working on their griev-
ances almost immediately, without the need for a drawn-out certification process,
or a campaign to win over the entire workplace that subjects workers to harass-
ment and allows employers to pit workers against each other. The Canadian and
American bargaining systems were designed for male manufacturing workers in
vertically integrated industries95 and “not designed to protect vulnerable work-
ers… in sectors like fast food.”96 Conversely, these new forms of  organizing
were created with the issues of  low-wage workers in mind. As IWJ coordinator
Dianne Enriquez says: “workers’ centers are basically responding to the new
economy we have,… It’s a branch of  the labor movement, but just a different
model.”97
Despite these advantages, legitimate questions remain about the efficacy
of  these organizing models for fast food workers. If  a Squamish workers or soli-
darity network had been available in 1998, it may well have helped Lowinger,
Wiebe, and other workers confront Savage with their issues, and won some
improvements on conditions, safety, and the sick leave policy. It might have even
eliminated some of  the harsh treatment they received from managers. However,
Fine echoes Gross by pointing out that workers centers have small memberships
and many lack a coherent strategy for growth. Their sustainability, especially
financially, is uncertain. Furthermore, how would they have influenced the strug-
gle in Squamish in the medium to long term? If  Lowinger and Wiebe’s com-
plaints were met with a firing, something workers are legally protected from dur-
ing a union drive, what would a workers’ centre or solidarity network be able to
do? Perhaps regain the job, but that fight could derail energy and resources from
the original set of  demands. In the long term, too, there are real questions as to
whether a workers’ centre could help create durable changes in a fast food work-
place. Would a franchise owner temporarily acquiesce, then renege on whatever
informal agreement he had reached? Without a contract, would workplace
activism turn into the Sisyphean task of  constantly refighting the same battles?
There is some promise in the leadership training and bottom-up mili-
tancy of  workers’ centres and solidarity networks, especially their facility for
training leaders and providing experience in fighting and winning battles. Still,
left unionists need to be involved in an ongoing project of  creating durable,
worker-led unions, as the IWW is attempting to do at Jimmy John’s, Starbucks,
and elsewhere, along radical lines of  democracy, militancy, and direct action. The
IWW unions combine a grounding of  action in workers’ leadership and daily
experience with the intention of  creating durable foundations for long-term radi-
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cal change on the job. Compared to unions like the CAW, they lack funds.
However, this may not be as crucial a variable as it may first appear. No union
has sufficient funds to match a McDonald’s or Wal-Mart anyhow, and any cam-
paign will depend on community support and membership mobilization and
strength, two factors that do not depend on income. While the challenge is still
daunting, a grassroots, sustained approach may yet bear fruit. The battles at
Starbucks and Jimmy John’s were not resounding victories for the IWW, but they
definitely hold promise.98
Considering that more traditional mainstream unionism mainstream
unionism has consistently failed to win contracts for these workers, the radical
alternative is certainly worth a shot. In Vanessa Tait’s study of  poor workers’
unions, she quotes Joann Wypijewski as saying that, “it took fifty years for work-
ers to figure out industrial organizing. When it took off  it was part of  a mass
movement.”99 Worker-led organizations, like workers’ centres, the IWW, and soli-
darity networks offer the best hope building that movement, even if  a break-
through may yet take some time.
In concert with radical, direct-action unionism, it is my opinion that left
unionists and labour scholars should continue to advocate for changes to labour
law.  There are several changes that could help these workers and workers in
other industries. It would be foolish not to explore them, even if  their enactment
currently seems remote. I agree with Julius Getman that laws banning the
replacement of  striking workers would be a major refashioning of  the terrain of
class struggle, though that achievement seems almost inconceivable in this cli-
mate. I also agree with him that a law guaranteeing unions equal access to
employees during campaigns could be of  benefit, but, as Rosemary Warskett
observes, it seems unlikely that this law could be effectively enforced. On the
other hand, I disagree with his dismissal of  card check laws as unimportant. The
Squamish shows case that card check enables a quick response to workers’
desires to unionize, and helps maintain momentum that would otherwise be lost
under drawn-out certification elections readily subject to employer intimidation. 
This is borne out by Kendra Coulter’s study of  retail organizing in the
Toronto area in the early 1990s. One organizer concluded that, “the secret ballot
vote in small workplaces is devastating. Women had a fear of  the consequences,
they generally believed that [the corporate representatives] knew which side of
the line they were on and if  the union didn’t go through, they would be fired....
We had enough cards signed. We had convinced the women, they understood;
their husbands had agreed. Everything was good but when it came out and it
was time for the vote, people said ‘oh my god, there are only fourteen of  us.’
They were scared that they were going to be picked out, because managers had
talked to them for hours. It was the secret ballot vote that killed us.”100 Finally,
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the single most effective legal change that would have benefitted the workers at
Squamish would be a requirement that one union contract is negotiated before a
union can be decertified. This would give the union a fair chance to show work-
ers what it can do, and would prohibit corporations from using their superior
resources to run out the clock during disputes with workers. However, enacting
new labour laws should be a secondary goal. The primary agenda for left union-
ists should be building democratic, radical unions that can win agreements in this
sector, no matter the legal climate.
In the 1970s, the high turnover, low wages, employer surveillance, and
intimidation experienced by fast food workers was, if  not anomalous, then at
least outside the ideological mainstream of  Fordist capital-labour relations in
North America. In 2011, the insecure, precarious work of  the fast food sector is
much more representative of  North American work as a whole. While Ritzer’s
theory of  McDonaldization is underhistoricized in ignoring how casualized, low-
wage labour has long been central to the restaurant economic model, he is cor-
rect to point out that growth of  employment in the fast food sector is an impor-
tant and influential development in work under capitalism. As Royle notes, the
struggle over labour relations in fast food is no less than a contestation of  “the
orthodoxy of  economic liberalism… in which multinationals roam the globe in
search of  bigger profits, inadequately fettered by existing regulation.”101 The
experiences of  these workers, especially their increased contingency, location in
the growing food and retail sector, and deskilled labour has set a pattern. They
are cornerstones of  what has happened to work in the West over the past fifty
years. In particular, they are where we need to look to understand the unceasing
assaults on unions, rising inequality, diminished upward mobility, and corporate
structures built on surveillance, control and fear. Fortunately, these fast food jobs
may also be a laboratory for new forms of  worker organization that win real
gains for working people. The Squamish campaign may have ended in defeat, but
it will have not have been in vain if  its lessons are heeded by scholars and
activists alike. 
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